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I. INTRODUCTION
Voluntary self-assessment is a longstanding and indispensable
aspect of our federal income tax system.' The Internal Revenue Code
requires taxpayers to file timely and accurate returns of their taxable
income and to pay the taxes due.2 Taxpayers generally comply with
* Professor of Law, McGrath North Mullin & Kratz Endowed Chair in Business Law, Creighton
University School of Law, morse@creighton.edu.
1. See Millsap v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 926, 931 n.10 (1988). The court stated:
This concept [that a return is required for an assessment of federal income tax] is deeply
rooted in our history. In part, our country was founded as the result of tax revolt wherein
citizens protested being taxed without their consent. Our tax system is rooted in the
concept of voluntary compliance which does not permit the government to arbitrarily
assess tax without a proper list or report.
Id.
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6001 (West 2008) (imposing general obligation to keep records and
make returns); § 6012 (requiring income tax returns); § 6072 (noting the time for filing income tax
returns); § 6151 (noting the time and place for paying taxes).
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these obligations without direct intervention by the government.3 The
"tax gap" is born in this private zone of voluntary compliance whenever
a taxpayer, whether intentionally or unintentionally, reports and pays
less tax than if the law were correctly applied.4
Taxpayers have sometimes misunderstood what voluntary
compliance means.5 Unfortunately, that misunderstanding works to their
detriment. Legal penalties, including civil and criminal sanctions for
taxpayers6 and their professional advisors,7 are designed to reinforce the
Code's requirements to file and pay one's taxes.8 However, the efficacy
of penalties to deter noncompliance is ultimately linked to prospects for
enforcement, which in turn requires discovery of noncompliance.
The Federal government has various means at its disposal to
discover noncompliance by taxpayers and to enforce the tax laws.
Examination powers are at the core of these efforts, as they allow the
government to penetrate a taxpayer's otherwise private realm to evaluate
whether reporting positions comply with the law and the facts.9 Laws
requiring disclosure of tax information by third parties also facilitate
government scrutiny of taxpayer reporting and enhance compliance.10
3. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP 6 (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax gapreport-fmal_080207_linked.pdf.
4. See id.
5. For example, in 1999, the Commissioner included this statement in the instructions for
Form 1040: "Thank you for making this nation's tax system the most effective system of voluntary
compliance in the world." In response, a taxpayer (or non-taxpayer, to be more accurate) asked:
"(1) Why does the Commissioner say that? (2) What does that mean? (3) How does it affect the
[Petitioner]?" Takaba v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 285, 288 (2002).
6. See, e.g., § 6651 (discussing failure to file penalty); § 6662 (discussing accuracy-related
penalties); § 6662(a) (discussing special accuracy-related penalties regarding reportable
transactions); § 6663 (discussing the fraud penalty). For criminal provisions applicable to
taxpayers, see, e.g., §§ 7201-07 (identifying various tax crimes).
7. See, e.g., § 6694 (discussing understatement of taxpayer's liability by tax return preparer);
§ 6695 (discussing other assessable penalties regarding preparation of tax returns for others); § 6700
(discussing promoting abusive tax shelters); § 6701 (discussing aiding and abetting understatement
of tax liability). For an overview and critique of rules and penalties imposed on preparers, see
generally Richard M. Lipton, What Hath Congress Wrought? Amended Section 6694 Will Cause
Problems for Everyone, 107 J. TAX'N 68 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties:. A Question of Values, 76 IOWA
L. REV. 309, 318 (1991). They may also help to offset some of the government's compliance costs,
although Professor Wood contests the validity of this purpose from a policy perspective. See id. at
319-20.
9. See § 7602 (discussing the examination of books and witnesses).
10. See generally Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play
in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007) (noting that "[t]he Article argues that substantive
federal income tax law can-and in many cases does-foster compliance by harnessing the
structural incentives of third parties."); William L. Burke, Tax Information Reporting and
Compliance in the Cross-Border Context, 27 VA. TAX REV. 399 (2007).
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Enforcement efforts have a direct and measurable impact on closing
the tax gap with regard to examined returns." Other benefits also
resonate throughout the tax system, which are more difficult to
quantify. 12 The threat of enforcement presumably reinforces voluntary
compliance; information developed from examination of taxpayer
returns may enhance prospects for accurately targeting those likely to be
noncompliant or particular noncompliant practices.13
Enforcement efforts involve significant costs for the government
and for affected taxpayers. 14  Some taxpayers selected for examination
have no changes to their returns, resulting in costs incurred by both
parties without any recovery of additional tax collections. 5 Although
information technology may increase the accuracy of targeting
enforcement efforts toward those likely to be noncompliant, 16 a low-tech
solution is also available. Informants or "whistleblowers"'17 potentially
enhance the effectiveness of examinations based on access to inside
information. The informant effectively becomes a tool for peeking
inside the otherwise private zone of voluntary compliance.
Whistleblower laws have been widely used by state and federal
governments to enhance enforcement and to prevent future harms from
violators.' 8 Although some statutes only protect the whistleblower
against retaliation, others also incentivize disclosure by providing
11. See infra Part 1l.
12. See id.
13. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY BUDGET IN BRIEF 6 (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/budget-in-brief-2008.pdf. The budget includes funding for
studies to capture data needed to "keep the IRS' targeting systems and compliance estimates up to
date" and to "develop strategies to combat specific areas of non-compliance, improve voluntary
compliance, and allocate resources more effectively." Id. One significant taxpayer benefit was the
potential to "reduce the burden of unnecessary taxpayer contacts." Id.
14. See id.
15. See infra Part l.
16. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP 3, 28-32 (2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/taxgap_report final 080207 linked.pdf.
17. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout the article, although the term
"informant" is arguably broader than the term "whistleblower," which might be interpreted as an
employee who informs on his or her employer. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "whistleblower" as "an employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or
law-enforcement agency").
18. See generally Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1757, 1768-72 (2007) (discussing various models for whistleblowing legislation); Mary K. Ramirez,
Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform, 76 U. CN. L. REV. 183, 191
(2007) (noting that "[t]he sheer number of anti-retaliation laws illustrate[s] that whistleblowers are a
critical component to effective law enforcement in a complex society as insiders often furnish
invaluable assistance in the investigation and prosecution of public corruption and corporate
fraud.").
2009]
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monetary rewards. 9 Such incentives may indeed enhance enforcement
effectiveness, but collateral impacts on other social values, including
privacy and fidelity in professional relationships, also deserve
consideration.
This article provides a critical look at the current scheme for
rewarding tax informants, and in particular on the relatively new
program for so-called "whistleblower awards." Despite enhanced
incentives for informants to come forward, tax award programs continue
to operate in an environment based on discretion and uncertainty.
Additional legislation is needed to clarify uncertainties and to limit
eligibility for rewards, including protection of private tax return
information from disclosure and preventing the government from
incentivizing the breach of confidential obligations through offering
rewards.
Part II provides an overview of the IRS examination function and
examines data involving the utility of informants in selecting returns for
examination. Part III explores the statutory scheme for rewarding
informants under I.R.C. § 7623, which was recently amended to include
a separate whistleblower awards program affecting relatively large tax
20deficiencies. Part IV discusses some ethical and legal issues presented
by the current whistleblower scheme. In particular, it identifies the need
to protect professional obligations concerning confidentiality in the
context of enhanced compliance goals. It argues for further clarification
of reward parameters in order to provide appropriate incentives to help
reduce the tax gap, while providing a clear message of deterrence for
those who would violate professional or legal standards in making
disclosures.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IRS EXAMINATION FUNCTION
I.R.C. § 7602 provides broad authority for the Treasury Department
to "examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material"2' for the purpose of "ascertaining the correctness of
any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the
liability . . . for any internal revenue tax . . . or collecting any such
19. See Dworkin, supra note 18, at 1768-72. Professor Dworkin strongly favors legislation
that provides incentives in addition to mere protections against retaliation, criticizing the protective
model as based on the "faulty premise" that "most observers of wrongdoing are people of
conscience who would report the wrongdoing absent the fear of retaliation." Id. at 1768.
20. See I.R.C. § 7623(b) (West 2008).
21. See id. at § 7602(a)(I).
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liability. '22  The examination function entails significant coercive
powers including summons authority,23 which operates primarily against
the taxpayer whose return is under examination. As discussed below,
examinations raise revenues from taxpayers under examination, and they
are also likely to enhance tax administration in other important ways that
are more difficult to quantify. However, they also impose significant
costs on taxpayers, including those who are otherwise compliant.
A. Prophylactic Benefits
Approximately 179 million tax returns were filed in 2007.24 The
sheer volume of returns suggests certain practical limits upon the
government's ability to examine all returns that may contain tax
underpayments. 25  Based on current audit practices, only about one
percent of these returns is likely to be examined.26 Moreover, a majority
of these examinations will involve a "correspondence" examination
focusing on select narrow issues, rather than a comparatively more
comprehensive "field" examination.27
Examinations contribute important intangible benefits that enable
the tax system to continue depending on voluntary compliance. The
Internal Revenue Manual states: "The primary objective in selecting
22. See id. at § 7602(a).
23. See id. at § 7602(a)(2).
24. See ELECTRONIC TAX ADMIN. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 18
(2007), available at http://www.njsea.org/ETAAC2007REPORT.pdf. Of these, approximately
136.3 million are individual returns; 6.51 million are corporate returns; 3.05 million are partnership
returns; with the balance consisting of fiduciary, payroll, unemployment, and exempt organization
returns. Id. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS 88 (2008) (pointing out
that, in addition to millions of tax returns, the IRS must also process nearly 1.5 billion information
documents each year).
25. Computer technology may provide a partial solution to the volume of information that
must be processed. The Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee estimates that
approximately 58 percent of all individual tax returns are expected to be filed electronically for the
2007 tax year. See ELECTRONIC TAX ADMIN. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 1
(2007), available at http://www.njsea.org/ETAAC2007REPORT.pdf. Benefits from electronic
filing include avoiding transcription of paper returns and validation of mathematical functions and
certain input data, which ultimately may benefit both taxpayers and the government. See id. at 9.
However, taxpayer concerns about enhanced audit rates (which may or may not be true) may be
limiting participation. See id. at 16 (noting "[tihere is a strong perception among many paper filers
that e-filing increases the chances of an audit. While we know that e-filed returns are twenty times
more accurate than paper ones, the IRS needs to address the audit concerns for this taxpayer
segment.").
26. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE STAT. 3-9 (2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irsenforcement-and-service-tables-fy_2007.pdf. This estimate
is based on the total examinations for individual returns (1,384,563) and business returns (59,516) in
fiscal 2007. Id.
27. There were 311,339 "field" audits and 1,073,224 "correspondence" audits reported for
individuals in fiscal 2007. See id. at 3.
2009]
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returns for examination is to promote the highest degree of voluntary
compliance on the part of taxpayers. 28  Despite limited examination
coverage, the knowledge that one could be selected for an examination
potentially reinforces the obligation to report fairly and honestly.
29
Taxpayers who are tempted to cheat may be deterred from deliberately
violating the law3° and honest taxpayers may be assured that they are not
alone in following the law. 31 These are important values that are likely
to enhance taxpayer commitment to compliance throughout the system.
In addition to promoting voluntary compliance, other benefits may
accrue within the tax system itself. Examinations may uncover facts
about taxpayer behavior that prove useful in designing better rules or in
designing better audit techniques. For example, they may identify areas
where complex rules are commonly misunderstood and misapplied,
indicating a need for simplification or additional clarification. As the
IRS has recognized, "[t]he complexity of the nation's current tax system
is a significant reason for the tax gap, and even sophisticated taxpayers
make honest mistakes on their tax returns. Accordingly, helping
taxpayers understand obligations under the tax law is a critical part of
improving voluntary compliance. 32
Examinations may also expose common means that taxpayers use
to cheat, and these experiences may be transmitted to revenue agents.
For example, industry specialization programs provide guidance and
training concerning specialized issues that may deserve audit attention.33
Such information can assist in improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of examination efforts by providing training and guidance
for examiners. To the extent that this information is also communicated
to taxpayers, additional voluntary compliance may also be achieved.34
28. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.1.1 (2006) (quoting Policy Statement P-4-21).
29. See Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 461 (1930) (noting,
"the purpose of these [IRS] audits is not to eliminate the necessity of filing the return, but to
safeguard against error or dishonesty.").
30. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY BUDGET IN BRIEF 2 (2008) (noting that estimates of
enforcement revenues "exclude[] the likely larger revenue impact from the deterrence value of these
and other IRS enforcement programs (e.g., criminal investigations)"), http://www.irs.gov/pub/
newsroom/budget-in-brief-2008.pdf.
31. Id. at I (noting that "[enhanced enforcement] ensure[s] taxpayers meet their tax
obligations, so that when Americans pay their taxes, they can be confident their neighbors and
competitors are also doing the same ... ").
32. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY BUDGET IN BRIEF 2 (2008),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/budget-in-brief-2008.pdf.
33. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CASH INTENSIVE BUSINESS: MARKET SEGMENT
SPECIALIZATION PROGRAM GUIDELINE (2003), available at 2003 WL 24183009.
34. Cf. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, § 5. The Revenue Procedure states:
The purpose of publication of revenue rulings and revenue procedures in the Bulletin is
to promote uniform application of the tax laws by Service employees and to assist
6
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B. Direct Benefits
Examinations help to close the tax gap in more quantifiable ways.
The IRS enforcement budget for fiscal 2007 was less than $7 billion.
35
It leveraged these resources to collect $59.2 billion in unpaid taxes
through its enforcement efforts in fiscal 2007, up more than twenty-one
percent from the $48.7 billion in fiscal 2006.36 Of this $59.2 billion,
about $23.5 billion was attributable to examinations, and $3.9 billion
came from document matching programs, which correlate information
reporting to amounts reported on taxpayer returns; the balance of $31.8
billion was attributable to collection efforts for previously determined
tax liabilities.37
As noted above, only about one percent of all returns is audited.
The IRS uses mathematical and statistical techniques, including a so-
called "Discriminate Index Function" (DIF) to weight various return
characteristics for purposes of selecting returns for examination.38
Particular algorithms or details regarding this function or methods for
return selection are closely guarded secrets, but considerable information
is provided concerning the examination rates for particular segments of
the population. Selected audit rates and information are displayed in
Table 1, below.
taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing Service personnel
and the public of National Office interpretations of the internal revenue laws, related
statutes, treaties, and regulations, and statements of Service procedures affecting the
rights and duties of taxpayers.
Id.
35. See 2008 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2008),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/budget-in-brief-2008.pdf.
36. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE STATISTICS (2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irsenforcementand servicetables_fy_2007.pdf.
37. See id.
38. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REFERENCE No. 2006-
30-092, THE INFORMANTS' REWARDS PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT
OVERSIGHT n.18 (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports
/200630092fr.html. For further discussion of the "discriminate index function," see infra note 49
and accompanying text.
20091
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Table 1: Selected Examination Rates by Segment, FY 200739
Individuals
All Individuals
Income >= $1 million
Income >= $200,000
Income >= $100,000
Income < $200,000
Income < $100,000
Businesses
All Businesses
Small Corp.
(Assets < $10 million)
Large Corp.
(Assets >=$ 10 million)
Large Corp.
(Assets>=$250 million)
S Corporation
Partnership
Total
Examinations
1,384,563
31,382
113,105
293,188
1,277,065
1,091,375
59,516
20,020
9,644
3,424
17,657
12,195
Returns filed in
Prior calendar year
134,421,400
339,138
3,942,702
16,599,800
130,478,698
117,821,600
9,072,828
2,171,144
57,357
12,588
3,909,730
2,934,597
This data shows that examination rates vary depending on income
demographics. Individuals earning under $100,000 are audited at only
about one ninth the rate for those earning $1 million or more, and only
about one third of the rate for those with incomes of $200,000 or more.
Business categories reflect a similar bias favoring large corporations
over their smaller counterparts.
The total for examinations shown in Table 1 does not reflect
differences in the extent of the examination. Correspondence
examinations, which are more limited in scope than a field examination,
make up a significant portion of examination coverage for individuals.
Table 2 breaks down correspondence and field examinations by income
strata:
39. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE STATISTICS (2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irsenforcement-and-servicetables_f y2007.pdf.
Examination
Coverage
1.03%
9.25%
2.87%
1.77%
0.98%
0.93%
0.66%
0.92%
16.80%
27.20%
0.45%
0.42%
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Table 2: Examination Types for Individuals, FY 200740
All Individuals
Income >=$1 million
Income >= $200,000
Income >=$ 100,000
Income < $200,000
Income < $100,000
Income
>=$1OOK,<200K
Total
Examinations
1,384,563
31,382
113,285
293,188
1,277,065
1,091,375
179,903
Field
Examinations
311,339
12,259
43,640
127,544
267,699
183,795
%of
Total
22.49%
39.06%
38.52%
43.50%
20.96%
16.84%
Correspondence
Examinations
1,073,224
19,123
69,645
165,644
1,009,366
907,580
83,904 46.64%
%of
Total
77.51%
60.94%
61.48%
56.50%
79.04%
83.16%
95,999 53.36%
Taxpayers with higher income levels are generally receiving a
greater percentage of field examinations (and a likely greater share of
examination resources) than lower income taxpayers. However,
somewhat surprisingly, those with incomes in the $100,000 to $200,000
range experience more field examinations (46.64%) than the millionaire
group (39.06%).
Although higher income strata generally have higher examination
rates, relatively few individual taxpayers will face field examinations.
As shown in Table 3 below, the risk of a field examination remains low
for every category, suggesting that the so-called audit lottery is still open
for those who wish to play.
Table 3: Field Examinations as Percentage of Prior Year Returns Filed,
FY 200741
All Individuals
Income >=$1 million
Income >=$200,000
Income >=$ 100,000
Income < $200,000
Income < $100,000
Field
Examinations
311,339
12,259
43,640
127,544
267,699
183,795
Total Returns
fromprioryear
134,421,400
339,138
3,942,702
16,599,800
130,478,698
117,821,600
Field Exam
Percentage
0.23%
3.61%
1.11%
0.77%
0.21%
0.16%
40. See id. The final category in this table is derived by subtraction of the figures from the
income >= $100,000 category from the income >= $200,000 category. The results from subtracting
the income < $100,000 category from the income < $200,000 category are comparable in
magnitude, although not identical.
41. See id.
2009]
9
Morse: Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to C
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
AKRON TAx JOURNAL
C. Costs to Government and Affected Taxpayers
Examinations are potentially costly for taxpayers and the
government. Generalizations about cost are fraught with difficulty, due
in part to variations in the nature and extent of the examination.
However, a general measure may be derived from budget figures for
enforcement activities. Assuming an annual budget of $7.2 billion for
enforcement,42 and assuming further that about forty percent of this
budget is spent on examination activities43 and that about 1.5 million
returns are examined,44 this translates into an average government cost
of $1,920 for each examined return.
Data disclosed by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA) provides another basis for an estimate based on
hours spent per return, which would seem to confirm that this $1,920
figure is a plausible estimate. A government study involving 997,550
returns from 1996 to 1998 that were selected for examination required
13,418,772 hours, or about 13.45 hours per return.45 This measure of
labor would translate to an adjusted hourly rate of approximately $143
per hour (including direct employee costs and associated overhead
costs), which does not seem unreasonable.46
Of course, examinations also impose costs on taxpayers.
Examinations can be intrusive and disruptive, imposing intangible costs
that are difficult to quantify. IRS training materials caution that "[i]n-
depth examinations of income may involve a thorough examination of
the taxpayer's books and records or contacting third parties. Examiners
should be sensitive to the burden this places on the taxpayer and the
impact an in-depth examination may have upon the taxpayer's personal
and professional life. '' 7 Moreover, if professional advice is required,
significant additional direct costs may also be incurred. Only in rare
42. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2008), http://www.irs.gov
/pub/newsroom/budget-in-brief-2008.pdf.
43. This is based on FY 2007 total of $59.2 billion, of which $23.5 billion (about 40%) was
attributable to collection. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. This metric assumes a pro
rata relationship between revenues and costs.
44. See supra Table 1.
45. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 38.
46. $1,920/13.45 hours= $142.75. The TIGTA Report also includes data from smaller return
samples, which generate a higher figure for hours per return. See id. Without more data as to the
method for selection, the larger sample would seem to provide a more reliable estimate.
47. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CASH INTENSIVE BUSINESS: MARKET SEGMENT
SPECIALIZATION PROGRAM GUIDELINE (2003), available at 2003 WL 24183009.
10
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cases will taxpayer costs be reimbursed, as in matters where the IRS
proceeded to litigation without substantial justification for its position.48
The primary method used by the IRS in selecting returns is known
as the "Discriminate Index Function" or "DIE" - which is a
mathematical weighting approach that assigns weights to different return
characteristics. 49 The DIF approach is reasonably effective in selecting
returns that produce positive audit adjustments, but a significant number
of examined returns nevertheless result in no changes. A sample of
examined returns for the years 2003 to 2005 showed that out of 15,832
returns selected pursuant to the DIF approach, 4,435 (twenty-eight
percent) resulted in no change.50 A larger sample of 997,550 returns for
fiscal years 1996 to 1998 showed 169,148 (seventeen percent) with no
changes.5
Examinations that produce no changes may nevertheless provide
useful information to the government concerning the particulars of
taxpayer compliance. Significant costs are nevertheless involved, and as
noted above, compliant taxpayers are unlikely to be reimbursed for
incurring them.
Comparative information concerning examinations conducted
pursuant to the informants' program and the DIF method confirm that
the informants' program not only produced fewer no-change returns,
thereby minimizing costs imposed on compliant taxpayers, but they also
returned a higher amount of adjustment dollars per hour. Salient results
are summarized in Table 4 below.
48. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7430 (West 2008) (permitting recovery of fees and administrative costs
by prevailing party in litigation unless position of the United States was "substantially justified").
For critical discussion of prevailing party awards, see generally Wm. Brian Henning, Comment,
Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 405, 419-25 (1999). Costs incurred in connection with an audit would
not be within the scope of an award under I.R.C. § 7430. See Columbus Fruit and Vegetable Co-op
Ass'n v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 525, 530-31 (1985) (quoting legislative history indicating that
preparing the petition or complaint that commences a tax case is the first of recoverable attorney's
fees, but any fees for services before that point may not be recovered as litigation costs).
49. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 38, at n. 18.
50. See id. at fig.3.
51. See id. at fig.2.
2009]
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Table 4: TIGTA Study Results for DIF and Informant Examinations 52
Total Total Adjustment No-Change
Adjustments Hours $/hour Return %
FY2003-2005
Informants $26,233,554 38,139 $688 21%
DIF $422,356,790 1,105,890 $382 28%
FY 1996-1998
Informants $160,091,580 169,259 $946 12%
DIF $7,358,908,430 13,418,772 $548 17%
These results indicate that using informants to gather information
about noncompliant taxpayers increases the likelihood of additional tax
collections from examinations. Informants have increased the dollars
returned per hour invested by the IRS, nearly doubling the proposed
adjustment per hour over the DIEF sample. Moreover, informants have
apparently reduced the number of no-change audits, thereby saving
scarce government resources and benefiting compliant taxpayers.
The above figures do not show the effects of additional costs
incurred due to awards on the net recovery obtained. However, the
TIGTA report indicates that expenditures for rewards through fiscal
2005 have been highly productive. As shown in Table 5 below, rewards
for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 have generated significant benefits
over and above the taxes, fines, penalties, and interest recovered in those
cases.
Table 5: Excess of Recoveries over Rewards to Informants
FY 2001-2005"3
Fiscal
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Recoveries $44,024,333 $66,940,519 $61,556,175 $74,130,794 $93,677,606
Rewards $3,337,035 $7,707,402 $4,057,476 $4,585,143 $7,602,685
Benefit $40,687,298 $59,233,117 $57,498,699 $69,545,651 $86,074,921
The figures in Table 5 show positive contributions from rewards to
informants. However, the direct impact on the tax gap during these
years seems modest - less than $100 million annually - although these
52. See id. at figs.2 & 3.
53. Seeid.atfig.1.
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figures do not measure any indirect effects on compliance that may
come from effective enforcement. Moreover, informants appear to be
getting a small part of the total recovery - rewards are averaging about
eight percent of the total recovered amount (which includes interest).
As discussed below, structural amendments to the
whistleblower/informant reward programs in 2006 are likely to increase
the total award payout. However, even if award percentages increase
substantially, the extra payout is unlikely to offset the gains to the
treasury that informants have historically generated. For example, even
if the adjustment per hour is reduced by a full thirty percent (i.e., the top
rate for prospective awards under I.R.C. § 7623(b)), the adjustment rate
per hour for informants would continue to be higher than that obtained
through the DIF approach.54 However, the extent to which the additional
awards will be effective in closing the tax gap remains untested. This
will depend, in part, on the administration of award programs, as
discussed below.
III. REWARDS FOR INFORMANTS
The Federal government has a long history of providing rewards or
incentives for information that assists in the enforcement of tax laws.
Federal legislation has provided for rewards for information with regard
to the enforcement of the tax laws since 1867.55 Two separate programs
currently provide a basis for seeking rewards for tax-related information,
and each program is explored separately below.
A. Discretionary Informant Rewards Under I.R. C. § 7623(a)
I.R.C. § 7623(a) continues a longstanding discretionary system for
authorizing the payment of rewards to informants. This provision
generally authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury "to pay such sums as
he[/she] deems necessary for - (1) detecting underpayments of tax, or
(2) detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of
violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at the same, in cases
54. To illustrate, using the FY2003-2005 adjustment for examinations initiated by informants
of $26.2 million (see Table 4, above), and assuming a full thirty percent of the adjustment is
diverted to a whistleblower under I.R.C. § 7623(b), that would still leave $18.3 million for the
government and a net adjustment per hour of $481, which would continue to exceed adjustment
rates from the DIF approach.
55. See Dacosta v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 549, 552 & n.5 (2008); History of the
Whistleblower/Informant Program, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=181294,00.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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where such expenses are not otherwise provided for by law., 56
Legislation in 2006 substituted "or" for "and" between clauses (1) and
(2)." This amendment presumably clarifies and confirms that rewards
may be given for detecting both civil and criminal violations of tax laws.
However, regulations first promulgated in 1997 also state these two
criteria in the disjunctive. 8
Rewards are generally sourced from the "proceeds of amounts
collected by reason of the information provided."59  Prior to the
amendment in 2006, rewards could not be based on interest, but instead
were restricted to the recovery of taxes and penalties. 60 Thus, the 2006
amendment potentially expands the base from which these discretionary
rewards may be paid. This change effectively compensates the
informant for waiting until the IRS collects these amounts from the
taxpayer before obtaining payment of an award.61
Treasury regulations62 and other administrative pronouncements 63
provide additional guidance to prospective informants, but they provide
no basis to determine either eligibility or the amount of the payment.6
The discretionary nature of rewards in this context has been confirmed
in case law involving the adjudication of claims by informants seeking
to recover their rewards.
56. I.R.C. § 7623(a) (West 2008).
57. Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(l)(B), 120 Stat. 2922,
2958 (2006).
58. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a) (as amended by T.D. 8737, 1997-2 C.B. 273) (providing
that "[i]n cases where rewards are not otherwise provided for by law, a district or service center
director may approve a reward, in a suitable amount, for information that leads to the detection of
underpayments of tax, or the detection and bringing to trial and punishment of persons guilty of
violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at the same." (emphasis added)). This regulatory
change was promulgated in T.D. 8737, 1997-2 C.B. 273, which included temporary regulations
issued in response to section 1209 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452
(1996).
59. I.R.C. § 7623(a).
60. See Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1)(C), 120 Stat.
2922, 2958 (2006) (striking the parenthetical restriction "other than interest" from current §
7623(a)).
61. However, to the extent that interest assessed precedes the date the informant provides
information, the informant receives a direct benefit that does not correlate to the time value of his
award.
62. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1.
63. For current guidance from the IRS regarding awards for whistleblowers, see, for example,
Whistleblower-nformant Award, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=180171,00.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 733, REWARDS FOR
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2004), available
at http://Iib.store.yahoo.net/lib/realityzone/UFNIRSrewards.pdf.
64. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1; INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.2.2 (1999).
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For example, in Confidential Informant v. United States,65 an
informant brought a claim against the government in the United States
Court of Federal Claims based on what he had characterized as a
"substantive right pursuant to I.R.C. § 7623.' 6 At the core of this claim
was whether I.R.C. § 7623 was "money-mandating," which was
67necessary to invoke jurisdiction of the claims court. However, the
court rejected the informant's claim of a putative right to an award on
the grounds that "neither the statute nor the regulation contains specific
requirements that an informant must meet in order to be eligible for
compensation. Furthermore, neither the statute nor the regulation states
a sum certain.
68
Regulations state that a "district or service center director"
determines whether a reward will be paid and the amount of the reward
based on "[a]ll relevant factors, including the value of the information
furnished in relation to the facts developed by the investigation of the
violation. ' 69 Regulations also provide that "[t]he amount of a reward
will represent what the district or service center director deems to be
adequate compensation in the particular case, generally not to exceed
fifteen percent of the amounts (other than interest) collected by reason of
the information., 70  Thus, the regulations only provide an outer
percentage limit for an award, but they do not entitle a claimant to a
particular amount.
Claims based on a putative contract with the IRS to pay a reward
for information, which would be money-mandating, are difficult to
prove. One significant barrier is found in the regulations, which state in
part: "No person is authorized under this section to make any offer, or
promise, or otherwise to bind a district or service center director with
respect to the payment of any reward or the amount of the reward.,
71
Persons other than the district or service center director are not expressly
authorized to contract on the government's behalf.
72
65. 46 Fed. Cl. 1 (2000).
66. Id. at 4.
67. See id. at 5-6.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c).
70. See id. The restriction "other than interest" in the current regulations does not yet reflect
changes from the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. See discussion supra notes 59-61.
71. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c).
72. See, e.g., Confidential Informant v. United States, 46 Fed. CI. 1, 7 (2006) (noting that
"[b]ecause neither the statute nor the implementing regulation granted the government officials in
this case the authority to bind the government in contract, plaintiffs contractual theory of relief
cannot rely on the express authority of the government agents.").
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A recent case illustrates the difficulties encountered in seeking a
discretionary reward. In Abraham v. United States,73 the claimant
became suspicious about the estate tax return that was being prepared for
his mother's estate. He contacted the IRS with these concerns and was
allegedly advised by the agent on duty that he would receive a reward of
fifteen to twenty-five percent of the taxes collected if he would submit a
letter documenting his concerns along with a check for his share of
estate taxes due. 74  Abraham duly complied by sending such a letter
along with a check for $109,292."5
The Service audited the returns and after years of litigation, it
collected a deficiency of some $1.125 million from the estate.76
Abraham thereafter filed an "Application for Reward for Original
Information," and his claim was rebuffed by the IRS. 7 He filed suit in
the Court of Federal Claims alleging breach of contract and demanding
ten to fifteen percent of the deficiency under I.R.C. § 7623(a).71
Despite precedents adverse to the creation of a contract claim until
the amount of the award is fixed and promised by the IRS, 9 the court
permitted this taxpayer to go forward with proof that an "implied in fact"
contract may exist between the taxpayer and the government.80  Here,
instead of an indefinite offer that would otherwise preclude the
formation of a contract because there was no acceptance by the
government, the claimant had asserted a specific offer, to which he
responded with a letter and a check.81 As for the authority of an agent to
bind the government, the court would allow proof on the issue of
whether implied actual authority existed in this case - despite the fact
that the regulations limit express authority.
82
Cases like Abraham show the perils faced by potential claimants in
collecting their rewards. If Abraham is successful in his claim, he will
73. 81 Fed. Cl. 178 (2008).
74. Id. at 179, 186.
75. Id. at 179.
76. Id. at 180.
77. Id.
78. Abraham had filed an earlier claim in the Tax Court under the whistleblower provisions,
but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id. Presumably, the lower percentage that
Abraham requested reflects the general limitation found in the regulations applicable to informant
rewards, rather than the higher amount allegedly promised by the agent that may have contemplated
an award under the whistleblower program of I.R.C. § 7623(b).
79. See, e.g., Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Merrick v.
United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that "[a]n enforceable contract will arise.
•. only after the informant and the govemment negotiate and fix a specific amount as the reward.").
80. See Abraham v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 178, 183-87 (2008).
81. Seeid. at186.
82. See id. at 186-87.
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potentially offset his share of estate taxes and impose an additional
burden on his fellow beneficiaries. Whether he will be paid at all,
however, is highly uncertain. The message to the informant community
in these circumstances does not appear encouraging. Short of
contracting in advance with the district or service center director (or
someone with express authority to negotiate on his or her behalf) for a
specific award, contract theory provides a doubtful remedy for this
uncertainty. Sound policy reasons may exist for limiting those who can
contract on behalf of the government, but raising this defense also raises
doubts concerning the reliability of IRS personnel and their
representations. As the Federal Circuit has commented in a case
involving another disaffected claimant for an award, IRS conduct in
these matters may sometimes "leave[] much to be desired in terms of
how the Government should treat its citizens.,
83
Even if the government follows through and pays a reward,
collection may take many years until litigation has run its course and the
amounts at stake are collected.84 Regulations permit an informant to
waive a claim to a future reward in exchange for a current payment.85
However, the Internal Revenue Manual requires that all rewards are
subject to repayment if the collections on which it is based are
subsequently reduced, presenting some additional risk to the claimant in
this context.86 Moreover, one would suspect that an early payment is
significantly discounted, reflecting a conservative measure of the
litigation or collection hazards in the particular case.87
83. See Krug, 168 F.3d. at 1310. See also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam
for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 363 (2008) (highlighting findings of the Treasury Inspector General,
including that "in 76 percent of the cases reviewers failed to offer any explanation for rejecting the
claim").
84. See id. (noting average delay of 7.5 years before obtaining awards).
85. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 1998).
86. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.2.2.9 (1999). A special agreement might alter this
requirement, though such agreements are discouraged. See id. § 25.2.2.5, 2. The Internal
Revenue Manual also cautions: "[I]n the interest of maintaining a viable informants' reward
program, the merit of requiring repayment should always be weighed against the veracity of the
informant and the information provided." Id § 25.2.2.9.
87. See id. § 25.2.2 illus.6, containing a "sample letter which may be used to offer the
informant an early reward" which states "by signing the Request for Early Award, you will be
waiving any possibility of a larger reward."
2009]
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B. Whistleblower Awards Under LR.C. § 7623(b)
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 also added I.R.C. §
7623(b) to the Code.8  This provision creates an alternative reward
system for high-value cases, which is intended to provide greater
certainty and predictability for potential claimants. However, as
discussed below, considerable discretion remains, and the scheme
adopted raises other significant and unanticipated problems for tax
administration.
1. Threshold Amounts
The award program under I.R.C. § 7623(b), entitled "Awards to
Whistleblowers," applies to enforcement actions where the "tax,
penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute
exceed $2,000,000. ",89 Additionally, if an individual taxpayer is
involved, that individual must have gross income in excess of "$200,000
for any taxable year subject to such action."90
The rationale for imposing a relatively high threshold - $2 million
- for the disputed amount is not clearly stated. Legislation has been
introduced to amend this provision by reducing this amount to $20,000,
but this change was not enacted. 91 The high threshold will likely
relegate most potential claims to the discretionary informant program in
I.R.C. § 7623(a), rather than to the whistleblower award program.
There are plausible policy reasons for limiting whistleblower
claims to high-value targets in the initial phases of this program. The
Whistleblower Office is a new division within the IRS that is charged
with administering the whistleblower award program. 92  It may be
prudent to limit the extent of its obligations in order to ensure that it is
able to handle the workload effectively. Focusing on the highest value
targets will also be most likely to generate favorable adjustments in
88. See Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 406(a)(1)(D), 120 Stat. 2922
(2006). For one commentator's assessment of the impetus behind these changes, see Ventry, supra
note 83, at 362-68.
89. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5)(B) (West 2008).
90. Id. at § 7623(b)(5)(A).
91. See H.R. 1591, 110th Cong. § 543(a) (Ist Sess. 2007).
92. See Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 406(b)(1), 120 Stat. 2922,
2959-60 (2006) (defining functions of the Whistleblower Office); IRS Begins Work on
Whistleblower Office; Whillock Named First Director, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. NEWSROOM
(Internal Revenue Serv., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.irs.gov
/newsroom/article/0,,id=167542,00.html.
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relation to the costs incurred.93 Establishing a favorable track record
may be an important foundation for seeking additional funding for future
efforts of this nature.
The rationale for imposing an additional income limit for individual
taxpayers is less clear. Satisfaction of the $2 million threshold would
seem to provide a sufficient basis for IRS attention regardless of whether
an individual has a modest annual gross income. Nevertheless, this
restriction is unlikely to impose a significant practical constraint on
eligibility. Few taxpayers with income tax liabilities exceeding the $2
million threshold would not also satisfy the $200,000 income limitation.
However, claims involving taxes that are not based on income, such as
those involving federal wealth transfer taxes, as well as aggregate claims
based on multiple open tax years for a taxpayer who failed to file
returns, could conceivably be affected by this income limit.
2. Award Parameters
If the above thresholds are met, the whistleblower award program
generally provides that the claimant "shall .. .receive as an award at
least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected proceeds..
. resulting from the action... or from any settlement in response to such
action."94 On its face, the statute defines this program in a manner that
is quite different from the discretionary informant program under I.R.C.
§ 7623(a). First, it generally entitles the whistleblower to an award,
rather than leaving this to the discretion of the district or service center
director.95 Second, it potentially increases the amount of such awards by
defining the minimum award at fifteen percent, which was the maximum
generally allowed under the discretionary informant award program.
96
Moreover, there are no caps on whistleblower awards, whereas the
93. Corporate tax abuses in prominent public cases may have also influenced Congress'
interest in focusing whistleblower incentives on large corporate targets. For example, Enron
Corporation reported positive income for financial reporting purposes, but paid taxes in only one
year during the period 1996-2001. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PUB. NO. JCS-3-03,
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING
FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (2003). Even though
Enron was under audit, the full scope of tax misconduct was not known until after its collapse. See
id.
94. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1).
95. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 1998) (stating that "[t]he amount of a
reward will represent what the district or service center director deems to be adequate compensation
in the particular case, generally not to exceed fifteen percent of the amounts (other than interest)
collected by reason of the information.").
96. See id.
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discretionary awards under I.R.C. § 7623(a) are capped at a maximum of
$10 million.97
The whistleblower award program may circumscribe the role of
IRS discretion, but it does not eliminate discretion entirely. The
Whistleblower Office of the IRS, which is authorized to process tips
received by taxpayers and to determine eligibility for whistleblower
awards,98 must still determine whether to proceed with an enforcement
action. In particular, the statute requires that the IRS must proceed with
an enforcement action "based on information brought to the Secretary's
attention" in order to secure an award. 99 Further, determining the
amount of the award within the range of fifteen to thirty percent of the
recovery depends primarily on "the extent to which the individual
substantially contributed to such action."' 00
First, whether the IRS proceeds "based on" information provided
by the whistleblower is potentially complex, leaving room for
uncertainty. For example, if multiple sources provide the same
information, then which of them has brought the matter to the IRS's
attention for purposes of being entitled to the award? If the IRS had
previously been building a case, must additional whistleblower
information be outcome-determinative in the decision to proceed?
Stated differently, is one entitled to an award when the IRS proceeds
based "in part" on that information? Or is it "primarily" on that
information? Or is the standard somewhere in between?
Second, the parameters for determining whether an individual
"substantially contributed" also present uncertainty. The determination
appears to involve an inquiry into the connection between information
the whistleblower provides and the ultimate success of the IRS claim
asserted against the taxpayer.' 0' Moreover, whether the individual
"substantially contributed" is arguably limited to determining the level,
97. See Ventry, supra note 83, at 364 (discussing the history of IRS practices in raising caps
on awards).
98. See generally Whistleblower Office At-a-Glance, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0
,,id=179207,00.html (last visited May 27, 2008).
99. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1).
100. Id.
101. Compare INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.2.2.17 (1999), which provides with regard
to informant cases that
[n]o reward is allowable if the information originally furnished was unworthy of
investigation even if the return is examined at some later date (but without reference to
the information furnished) and a deficiency is assessed. Such claims should be rejected
on the basis that the information did not cause the investigation nor did it, in itself, result
in the recovery of taxes, fines, and penalties.
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within the fifteen to thirty percent range, at which a payment should be
made.
Although some discretion may be unavoidable, additional guidance
as to the meaning of whether the information "substantially contributed"
and its relationship to the "based on" determination would be helpful to
enhance certainty and predictability of this process. For example,
suppose the IRS already has information in its possession showing a
likely deficiency, but it needs further proof to establish penalties for
fraud. If a whistleblower provides this information and further actions
are taken to assert fraud penalties, has the "based on" test been met? If
so, has the individual substantially contributed? Is the award to be
constrained to the amount collected from that issue, if the examination
was already underway? 10 2  Additional administrative guidance here
would be appropriate to limit potential litigation on these kinds of
questions.
The statute indicates that the source of the information provided by
the whistleblower may also be important in determining eligibility for an
award. If the Whistleblower Office determines an action is:
based principally on disclosures of specific allegations (other than
information provided by the individual described in paragraph (1))
resulting from a judicial or administrative hearing, from a
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, the Whistleblower Office may award such sums as it considers
appropriate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the collected
proceeds . . . resulting from the action . . . taking into account the
significance of the individual's information and the role of such
individual and any legal representative of such individual in
contributing to such action.
103
Thus, the whistleblower award program arguably permits, but does
not require, an award of no more than ten percent if the whistleblower
merely transmits information that comes from a public source, such as a
judicial hearing, government report, or news story. Such information
102. The Code provides that the award is a percentage of "collected proceeds ... resulting
from the action (including any related actions). ... I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1). This indicates that
information leading to an audit for one issue, but which expands to address other issues (i.e., with
such expansions constituting "related actions"), may generate a whistleblower award that is a
percentage of the entire recovery. Internal guidance regarding the assessment of whistleblower
claims indicates that analysis of audit plans is one part of the evaluation of whether to proceed. See
Memorandum from the Commissioner of Large and Mid-Size Business Division to all LMSB
Industry Directors (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/lmsb/lmsb-4-0508-
033.pdf.
103. § 7623(b)(2)(A).
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would have doubtful utility to the IRS, which would already have access
to the information and could act independently to initiate an
examination. Discretionary powers to provide a lesser award (or none at
all) in this context resemble those in I.R.C. § 7623(a).
The statute also states that discretion to deny an award based on
public information "shall not apply if the information resulting in the
initiation of the action described in paragraph (1) was originally
provided by the individual provided in paragraph (1)."' 0' This enigmatic
statement contemplates that, for example, a whistleblower may provide
information before it becomes available from a public source, such as
the news media or a judicial hearing. The subsequent availability of that
information would not necessarily deprive the whistleblower of an
award at the minimum fifteen percent level under I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1),
assuming the IRS acted based on the information and it otherwise
substantially contributed to the success of the enforcement effort. °5
In addition to evaluating the source of the information and its
contribution to the success of the IRS claim, the statute also requires the
Whistleblower Office to evaluate whether the claim for an award "is
brought by an individual who planned and initiated the actions that lead
to the underpayment of tax [or other violation of Internal Revenue
laws].' 0 6  If so, the Whistleblower Office "may appropriately reduce
[the] award."'0 7  If that individual is convicted of criminal conduct
arising from his or her role in planning and initiating these actions,
discretion is eliminated and the award must be denied.
08
A recent IRS memorandum provides additional guidance on the
administrative processing of whistleblower cases, including the handling
of so-called "tainted" information coming from the whistleblower.'0 9
Tainted information "includes, but is not limited to information that is
privileged, illegally obtained by the whistleblower, or information
obtained by the government in a non-passive manner." ' 10 The memo
advises that tainted information may provide a basis for rejecting a
104. § 7623(b)(2)(B).
105. See § 7623(b)(1). As discussed below, the IRS may also seek additional cooperation or
assistance from an informant. In this context, the substantial contribution analysis might also
include effort as well as information.
106. See § 7623(b)(3).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Memorandum from the Commissioner of Large and Mid-Size Business Division to all
LMSB Industry Directors (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/lm sb/Imsb-4-
0508-033.pdf.
I10. Id. at3.
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whistleblower claim."' The memo also suggests, however, that in some
cases, tainted information will be passed along to the audit team.'
12
Tainted information constrains the Whistleblower Office's ability to
engage in additional contacts with the whistleblower for purposes of
developing the information necessary to continue with an enforcement
action, and it requires additional analysis to determine whether, and in
what circumstances, it could be used as evidence. 1 3 This constraint may
contribute to the use of third-party representatives, who may assist a
prospective whistleblower in developing the necessary information prior
to contacting the Whistleblower Office."
14
3. Judicial Review in the Tax Court
The Code provides that whistleblower award determinations are
eligible for judicial review by the Tax Court." 5  As discussed above,
decisions involving discretionary awards under I.R.C. § 7623(a) are not
eligible for judicial review unless the informant can establish a contract
for payment.1 6  In contrast, a whistleblower seeking an award under
I.R.C. § 7623(b) has standing to enforce his or her claim to an award
regardless of whether a contract exists. The statute expressly provides
that "[n]o contract with the Internal Revenue Service is necessary for
any individual to receive [a whistleblower award]." ' 17 A whistleblower
under I.R.C. § 7623(b) also receives another benefit that informants
under I.R.C. § 7623(a) generally do not receive: the ability to deduct
attorney fees and court costs in enforcing that claim as an above-the-line
deduction." 
8
111. Id. at 4 (listing among four examples of reasons to reject a claim, "the claim results from
information that is subject to privilege that was not waived by the taxpayer").
112. Id. at 2 (stating that "[i]f informant information is tainted, the [subject matter expert] and
anyone who reviews the tainted information will not be able to participate in the civil examination
after the information is passed on to the audit team.").
113. See id. at 3. This analysis may involve a determination of whether the whistleblower is
subject to the so-called "one-bite" rule applicable to employees or representatives of the taxpayer.
See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2008-011 (Feb. 27, 2008), available at 2008 WL 623141.
114. See infra note 139 and accompanying text
115. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (West 2008).
116. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text See also Destefano v. United States, 52
Fed. Cl. 291, 293 (2002) (stating that "[t]he applicable statute and regulation [i.e., I.R.C. § 7623(a)
and Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1] neither create contractual obligations upon the Government nor do
they empower judicial review.").
117. § 7623(b)(6)(A).
118. See § 62(a)(21). However, this benefit may prove illusory if the whistleblower is required
to pay costs or fees in a taxable year that differs from the year the award is paid. This deduction is
not available for "any deduction in excess of the amount includible in the taxpayer's gross income
for the taxable year on account of such award." Id.
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The statutory scheme outlined above does not define the scope of
review to be applied by the Tax Court. The review process also presents
the possibility that otherwise secret policies and practices within the IRS
will need to be disclosed and analyzed in order to evaluate the
whistleblower's claim. The privacy of the targeted taxpayer is also
potentially at risk through the need to disclose return information to
allow judicial review of a whistleblower award claim. Finally, the
identity of the whistleblower may also be disclosed in this process.
These unresolved issues concerning the judicial review process are
discussed below.
a. Scope of Review
On October 3, 2008, the Tax Court promulgated amendments to its
rules governing whistleblower cases." 9 Title XXXIII of these amended
rules includes new rules 340 to 344 containing procedures for
whistleblower claims. Rule 341(b) provides the basic content of the
"Petition for Whistleblower Action Under Code Section 7623(b)(4),"
which requires, in addition to a copy of the IRS determination under
review, "lettered statements explaining why the petitioner disagrees with
the determination by the Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower
Office" and "lettered statements setting forth the facts upon which the
petitioner relies to support the petitioner's position.'1 2°
Significantly, these rules are silent as to the scope of review before
the Tax Court. The explanation to new Rule 340 states in part: "Without
specific statutory direction establishing whether whistleblower actions
are to be decided on the administrative record, the Court contemplates
that the appropriate scope of review will be developed in case law.' 12 1
Congress' failure to provide guidance is problematic. If the purpose
behind judicial review is to ensure that a whistleblower who is entitled to
an award receives one (thereby preventing government misconduct from
denying the right to recover), a de novo evaluation of the relevant
evidence concerning eligibility for an award would most fully achieve
that purpose.
A more deferential and limited scope of review, such as applying
an abuse of discretion standard to the determinations in the record made
by the Whistleblower Office, would admittedly be an improvement over
119. See U.S. Tax Court Adopted Amendments to Rules of Practice and Procedure on
"histleblower Actions, 8 TaxCore (BNA) No. 194 (Oct. 7, 2008).
120. TAx CT. R. 341(b)(3)-(4).
121. TACT.R.340cmts.
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the purely discretionary system. However, it would provide
significantly less comfort to whistleblowers that the system is not rigged
against them. Unfortunately, that may be the only practical approach
available to the Tax Court in these circumstances, to the extent that a
thorough, adversarial review process injects the need to provide
whistleblowers with access to information that is otherwise protected by
law.
b. Disclosure of IRS Information
Treasury regulations restrict testimony and/or disclosure of IRS
records or information in various circumstances, such as where that
information might "disclose investigative techniques and procedures, the
effectiveness of which could thereby be impaired.' 22 The discretionary
informant award scheme did not require the IRS to disclose the basis for
rejecting an award. For example, in Conner v. United States,'23 the
Court of Federal Claims dismissed a pro se case brought by an informant
who claimed a monetary reward for reporting several individuals who
allegedly underpaid their taxes. 24 The claimant had received a rejection
letter from the IRS which effectively stated that "Federal disclosure and
privacy laws" prohibited disclosure of the specific reason for rejecting a
claim for an award.
25
In contrast, a whistleblower award claim involving the matter of
whether the IRS acted "based on" the taxpayer's information and
whether that information "substantially contributed"' 26 to the result
arguably requires evaluation of the scope and effect of various
investigative techniques, which otherwise would remain secret. 127
Neither Congress nor the Treasury has provided any basis for this kind
122. Treas. Reg. § 301.9000-2(a)(5) (2005).
123. 76 Fed. Cl. 86 (2007).
124. Id. at 87.
125. Id. A similar form letter is also found in the Internal Revenue Manual. See INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL § 25.2.2 illus. 7 ("Letter 1010(SC), which can be used to reject a claim for
reward").
126. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (West 2008).
127. For example, a subject matter expert (SME) within the whistleblower office is charged
with "[d]etermining if the audit team has already identified the issue or if the information could help
make the development of an existing issue more efficient or more complete. If the issue has been
identified, determine when and how the team identified it." Memorandum from the Commissioner
of Large and Mid-Size Business Division to all LMSB Industry Directors 2 (July 21, 2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/lmsb/hnsb-4-0508-033.pdf. Such determinations would
be important in order to evaluate whether the IRS proceeded based on the whistleblower's
information, but they would also potentially require access to audit work papers and plans.
2009]
25
Morse: Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to C
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
AKRON TAx JOURNAL
of disclosure, thus leaving the whistleblower in a difficult position with
regard to proving entitlement to an award.
c. Privacy Concerns for Targeted Taxpayers and
Whistleblowers
The privacy rights of taxpayers under investigation also present
potential concerns in whistleblower award litigation. Regulations
provide that neither testimony nor information may be disclosed if doing
so would violate the confidentiality of taxpayer information provided by
I.R.C. § 6103, or would violate regulations governing information
obtained under Bank Secrecy Act investigations. 28 In a whistleblower
award case, the amount of the award may depend on whether the IRS
collected a particular amount in a settlement (as opposed to litigation
where the results can be known to the public). Thus, resolution of such a
claim might require the disclosure of particular information from the
taxpayer under examination in order to satisfy the whistleblower that he
or she is receiving the appropriate amount. Such disclosures were
unnecessary in a discretionary system, but are likely in a system based
on rights.
Finally, litigation also presents concerns with regard to the
disclosure of the identity of the whistleblower and other information to
the public. Proposed legislation in 2007 sought to address general
privacy issues through an amendment of I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4), which
would state in part:
Notwithstanding sections 7458 and 7461, the Tax Court may, in order
to preserve the anonymity, privacy, or confidentiality of any person
under this subsection, provide by rules adopted under section 7453 that
portions of filings, hearings, testimony, evidence, and reports in
connection with proceedings under this subsection may be closed to
the public or to inspection by the public. 129
This amendment was not enacted, but ample administrative
authority nevertheless exists for the Tax Court to provide for
confidentiality and anonymity when necessary. 130 The October 3, 2008
128. See Treas. Reg. § 301.9000-2(a)(1) to (2) (2005).
129. H.R. 1591, 110th Cong. § 543(c)(4)(B) (1st Sess. 2007).
130. Despite a general practice favoring disclosure in judicial proceedings, I.R.C. § 7461(b)(l)
provides that "[t]he Tax Court may make any provision which is necessary to prevent the disclosure
of trade secrets or other confidential information, including a provision that any document or
information be placed under seal to be opened only as directed by the court." See also Anonymous
v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 89, 91-93 (2006) (discussing considerations for sealing records and
proceeding anonymously in the Tax Court).
26
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 24 [2009], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol24/iss1/1
WHISTLEBLOWERS AND TAX ENFORCEMENT
amendments to the Tax Court's rules include the following explanation,
which relates to the need to protect confidential information, including
the identity of the whistleblower:
Pursuant to section 7458, hearings before the Tax Court shall be open
to the public. Pursuant to section 7461(a), all reports of the Tax Court
and all evidence received by the Tax Court are generally public records
open to the inspection of the public. Pursuant to section 7461(b)(1),
the Court may issue protective orders, upon motion by a party or any
other person and for good cause shown, to prevent or restrict the
disclosure of trade secrets and other information. See Tax Court Rule
103(a). As result of this authority, in appropriate cases, the Court may
permit a petitioner to proceed anonymously and seal the record in that
case. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 89 (2006). The
Court contemplates that these generally applicable statutory
provisions, Rule 103, and related case law, while they do not require
the Court's records in all whistleblower actions to be sealed or require
the Court to permit all petitioners in those cases to proceed
anonymously, do provide authority for the Court to allow a petitioner
to proceed anonymously and to seal the record when appropriate in
whistleblower actions.131
This authority to protect the anonymity of the whistleblower and to
protect information from public disclosure does not resolve the problem
concerning the preservation of the privacy of the taxpayer under
investigation, where disclosure to the informant and his/her counsel may
be necessary to review an adverse determination concerning an award.
Temporary regulations have been promulgated to address this
disclosure of return information if the IRS contracts with the
whistleblower or his legal representative for additional services - a so-
called "tax administration contract.', 132  The preamble to these
regulations explains that I.R.C. § 6103(n) permits disclosure of return
131. TAXCT.R.340cmts.
132. See T.D. 9389, 2008-18 I.R.B. 863. The preamble states in part:
In analyzing information provided by a whistleblower, or investigating a matter, the
Whistleblower Office may determine that it requires the assistance of the whistleblower,
or the legal representative of the whistleblower. The legislative history of section 406 of
the Act states that "[t]o the extent the disclosure of returns or return information is
required [for the whistleblower or his or her legal representative] to render such
assistance, the disclosure must be pursuant to an IRS tax administration contract." Joint
Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of H.R. 6408, The "Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006," as Introduced in the House on December 7, 2006, at 89 (JCX-
50-06), December 7, 2006.
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information pursuant to a tax administration contract. 133 The preamble
also notes, however, that "it is expected that such disclosures will be
infrequent and will be made only when the assigned task cannot be
properly or timely completed without the return information to be
disclosed."' 34 Conditions for disclosure include restrictions that limit the
content to that which is relevant to the services being procured, and
appropriate safeguards must also be in place to ensure the continued
confidentiality of this information.
135
These regulations may assist whistleblowers with a tax
administration contract in obtaining information on which to evaluate an
award claim. However, other whistleblowers without such contracts
may still face problems in enforcing their claims, assuming that taxpayer
protections are otherwise taken seriously in this area.
Taxpayers targeted by whistleblower tips also deserve assurance
that their return information is not disclosed inappropriately to
whistleblowers seeking to enforce putative reward rights. Important
policy choices thus remain unresolved here within this tension between
taxpayer privacy and whistleblower rights. Reducing government
discretion in awards may have a salutary effect on the incentive to come
forward with information, but additional attention is required to provide
the rules that will fill the discretionary void. A form of in camera
review, in which the Tax Court accesses and reviews relevant documents
without disclosing them to the whistleblower, might provide one means
to resolve these tensions. In camera review processes have been used
regarding other sensitive materials, such as FOIA requests for sensitive
information affecting government investigations.1 36  However, these
processes are discretionary, and they involve potentially burdensome
tasks for judges without the assistance of adversary challenges to
evidence. It should also be noted that this approach to judicial review
will more closely resemble features of a discretionary award system,
which was part of the original need for reform. Clarification by
appropriate policymakers, rather than ad hoc development, would be a
preferable approach to developing the protocols for judicial review in
this context.
133. See id.
134. See id. (internal quotation omitted).
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., Lewis v. Internal Revenue Serv., 823 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1987) (exempting
IRS documents from FOIA request based on government affidavits, but allowing in camera review
as a discretionary matter to determine exempt status).
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IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: ADDITIONAL LIMITS FOR
WHISTLEBLOWER AWARDS?
Informant programs depend on the willingness to share information
for the purpose of assisting law enforcement efforts. Some persons with
information may be motivated to come forward in part by altruism or
moral duty, but the financial rewards available here inject intense
personal financial interests into this decision. The amount of the reward
could be substantial - perhaps even life-changing - especially under the
whistleblower award provisions, which are not subject to the cap of $10
million imposed on other discretionary informants. 137 Submissions of up
to $2 billion have been reported in the first year of the whistleblower
program, 138 and one firm specializing in assisting whistleblowers with
their claims has publicly reported over $5 billion in submissions. 139
Informants seeking whistleblower awards under I.R.C. § 7623(b)
must submit information under penalty of perjury. 140  The criminal
penalty for perjury - which may include fines and/or imprisonment for
up to five years - presumably deters intentionally false statements
designed to harass or harm prospective taxpayer investigation targets.14'
However, even information provided in good faith is not necessarily
foolproof. As noted above, informant-based examinations occasionally
produce no changes on audit, even though that result appears less likely
than under other examination selection techniques. 142  Thus, the
discretion and judgment of the IRS continues to be important in
determining whether to proceed on an informant's tip.'
43
The source of an informant's information is one aspect of that
discretion. Informants under I.R.C. § 7623(a) submit Form 211,
"Application for Award for Original Information," which asks the
informant, among other things, to "[d]escribe how you learned about
and/or obtained the information that supports this claim and describe
your present or former relationship to the alleged noncompliant
137. See Whistleblower - Informant Award, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=
18017 1,00.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
138. See Ventry, supra note 83, at 367.
139. See Advertisement by The Ferraro Law Firm, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, June 2008, at
101.
140. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(6)(C) (West 2008).
141. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (West 2008) (defining perjury and its penalties).
142. See supra notes 50-5 1.
143. One of the examples of reasons for denying a whistleblower claim is that "information is
not credible." See Memorandum from the Commissioner of Large and Mid-Size Business Division
to all LMSB Industry Directors 4 (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/
Imsb/imsb-4-0508-033.pdf.
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taxpayers." 144  This inquiry is arguably relevant for the purpose of
determining whether there is any reason to doubt the veracity of the
information provided. However, it is also relevant for the purposes of
evaluating whether there may be other reasons to avoid dealing with this
whistleblower.145  It may also affect whether the whistleblower is
eligible for an award at all, as in the case of one who planned or initiated
a transaction.
14 6
Whistleblowers who also planned or initiated an unlawful tax-
avoidance scheme are well-qualified to provide reliable information for
the purpose of identifying returns likely to generate positive tax
adjustments. Significantly, the Code does not prevent the IRS from
using the information gained from such persons as a basis for examining
taxpayers. However, it prevents the Whistleblower Office from granting
an award for such information if the informant's conduct in
planning/initiating on behalf of another results in a criminal
conviction. 147 Short of a conviction, however, planner/initiators are only
subjected to the uncertainty of a discretionary award.
Enhanced tax compliance is a worthy policy goal, but other values
are also at stake in defining the scope of appropriate enforcement
measures. The constraint on awards to planner/initiators reflects a
normative judgment by Congress that those who receive criminal
sanctions are not eligible for an award, despite the value of their
information. Other whistleblowers, however, may be subject to other
penalties short of criminal sanctions on account of their disclosure, but
they are still eligible for full whistleblower awards under this statute.
Does the Code go far enough in restricting the scope of award-
eligible behavior? For example, should the government induce an
informant to violate a longstanding professional obligation for trust and
confidentiality through offering a reward? Consider a prospective
informant who is a member of the bar with a professional obligation to
maintain confidentiality of client information. 148  Breaching client
144. Internal Revenue Serv., I.R.S. Form 211 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f21 l.pdf.
145. This includes the so-called "one-bite rule." See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2008-011
(Feb. 27, 2008), available at 2008 WL 623141.
146. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(3) (West 2008). See also discussion supra notes 106-108.
147. See § 7623(b)(3).
148. See, for example, MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002), which provides in
part: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is . . . authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)." Paragraph (b) allows disclosure,
among other things, "to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud" or to "prevent,
mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another ... [due to]
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confidentiality may result in civil sanctions, including disbarment, if the
breach is disclosed. 149 However, the Code does not preclude an award
based on this behavior; nor does it suggest that this behavior may
provide the basis for reducing or denying an award.
The value of confidentiality in the lawyer-client relationship has
persisted despite longstanding recognition that it may prevent us from
knowing the truth in some cases. 150 As Professors Geoffrey Hazard and
William Hodes have observed in their seminal work, The Law of
Lawyering, "the confidentiality principle can stand on a moral base of its
own. It creates a zone of privacy that cannot be breached by a too-
inquisitive government, and thus enhances the autonomy and individual
liberty of citizens."'' Admittedly, the primary mechanisms for
deterring disclosure of confidential information are likely to be found in
social and professional sanctions, rather than in criminal penalties.
However, the deterrent effect of the sanction of disbarment depends in
significant part on the economic penalty of being deprived of future
earnings from practicing a profession, along with reputational sanctions
that add to the harm in this economic calculus. 52 The efficacy of this
calculus, which ordinarily favors keeping a confidence, is threatened
when government alters it through potentially large rewards, particularly
when rewards may be granted without disclosing the identity of the
whistleblower.
An award program that offers discretionary payments that are
uncertain and modest in amount would be unlikely to tip the scales in
favor of disclosure, particularly if there were a risk of discovery that
could lead to professional or reputational sanctions. However, a
whistleblower award that is financially significant and provides
relatively greater certainty for payment presents heightened risks,
crime or fraud," which involves the use of the lawyer's services. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
Attorneys who are not giving advice that is used in planning or initiating transactions involving
crimes, but who merely become aware of information, would not be within the scope of these
permitted exceptions. Comments clarify that paragraph (b)(3), affecting disclosures for a crime or
fraud that has already occurred, "does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud
thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense." Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 8.
149. See Ventry, supra note 83, at 392.
150. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 132
(2d ed. Supp. 1998) (stating that "[i]t is the confidentiality principle that most often creates tension
between the law of lawyering and 'other' law, for it exacts significant sacrifice of the truth-finding
and justice-seeking aims of the law generally, and often requires that the victims of a client's
misdeeds be forsaken.").
151. Id. at 131.
152. See id. at 132 (stating that "lawyers demonstrate the moral values of trust and loyalty
when they say they will keep quiet and then do so, even when there are compelling reasons to speak
out.").
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particularly when a whistleblower may be insulated from reputational
harm and the prospect of professional sanction because his or her
identity remains secret. Even if the identity were disclosed, as in the
case where whistleblower testimony may be required, if the expected
value of the award exceeds the expected present value of future earnings
lost through disbarment by an amount sufficient to also offset any
reputational harms to the informant, this could tip the scales in favor of
disclosure. Such an award program may prove highly tempting to the
professional whose personal values of trust and loyalty to the client are
outweighed by his or her own personal financial self-interest.
153
Government should be cautious in creating incentives for citizens to
violate important ethical norms. The IRS has apparently recognized this
value in other limited contexts involving taxpayer representatives. As a
general matter, the Chief Counsel has advised IRS employees working
with informants that "under no circumstances is it appropriate to accept
any information from an informant ... when the informant is also the
taxpayer's representative in any administrative matter pending before the
Service."' 54 Although this language does not extend to all lawyer-client
relationships, it nevertheless reflects a propensity for restraint and
respect in this area. However, government restraint in this area is far
from settled, as other commentators have raised concerns about the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship in other legal matters where
attorneys may be required to disclose information to the government.
155
153. Professor Ventry suggests that the incentives to disclose professional confidences "could
be outweighed by the disincentives to share such information." Ventry, supra note 83, at 392-93.
However, this position does not seem to address the possibility that the whistleblower's act may not
ever be disclosed.
154. See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2008-011 (February 27, 2008), available at 2008 WL
623141. This Notice also cautions IRS employees to seek approval before engaging in additional
contacts with an informant that might violate the so-called "one bite" rule, which allows the
government to use information, even though it may have been obtained in an illicit or illegal
manner, as long as the government did not encourage or acquiesce in the informant's conduct.
155. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Cheney, Note, Leaving No Loopholes for Terrorist Financing: The
Implementation of the USA Patriot Act in the Real Estate Field, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1705, 1729-35
(2005) (discussing exemptions for attorneys to disclosure requirements under anti-money-
laundering rules, as well as under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley); Robert J. Jossen, Dealing with
the Lawyer's Responsibilities under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Ethical Dilemmas and
Practical Considerations (Oct. 6-7, 2005) (discussing disclosure and "noisy withdrawal" effects on
confidentiality obligations), available at SL 027 ALI-ABA 417 (West). Tax shelter transactions
have sometimes generated advocacy for relaxed protections of confidentiality and privilege for
those involved in planning and facilitating them. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Making a List and
Checking It Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge Who's Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
141 (2004) (arguing that limited privilege protection is appropriate in tax shelter matters); Brian R.
Ford, Note, Current Development, Helter Shelter: Protecting Taxpayers' Identities in Tax-Shelter
Cases, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 723 (2005).
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Discretion to deny an award to a planner/initiator under the
whistleblower program is useful in diminishing the possibility that a
professional in this category will be induced to betray a client.
5 6
However, the planner/initiator constraint is not sufficient for the purpose
of ensuring protection of other lawyer-client relationships. Not all
lawyers who have information about client noncompliance with tax laws
are considered planner/initiators. For example, a lawyer providing
advice to a taxpayer in an unrelated matter (such as criminal law) may
have access to information showing noncompliance. A blanket rule
prohibiting awards if the disclosure breaches an obligation of
professional ethics should be considered here in lieu of the more limited
planner/initiator restriction. An absolute bar for rewards to those with a
lawyer-client relationship - and possibly for other professional
relationships involving trust or confidence, such as physicians, financial
counselors, and certified public accountants - would send an appropriate
message to the professional community that the government does not
intend to induce professionals to breach their obligations to clients or
patients."'
Of course, not all obligations of confidentiality are alike. For
example, a foreign bank employee who disclosed depositor account
information in violation of foreign bank secrecy laws has generated
international attention in the area of tax enforcement. 58 Another bank
employee disclosed transactional details concerning the bank's
involvement in facilitating tax shelter transactions for others, though not
for the bank itself, which potentially involved more than $1.5 billion in
tax liability.' 59 Each of these cases may involve contractual obligations,
156. However, penalty provisions affecting return preparers also provide some deterrent effects
here, which would presumably impact a decision to disclose. See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
157. See, e.g., AICPA MODEL CODE OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 301 (1992) (requiring accountants
not to disclose confidential client information without specific consent from the client), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_300.html; AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS princ. IV
(200 1) (providing that "[a] physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the
law."), available at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/2512.html.
158. See Randall Jackson, The Mouse that Roared: Liechtenstein's Tax Mess, TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL, Mar. 3, 2008 (discussing actions of the IRS and other countries to pursue
taxpayers with Liechtenstein bank accounts disclosed by bank employee in violation of
Liechtenstein bank secrecy laws), available at http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.
nsf/Articles/9F2D96E5846A5FD985257404000F69AE?OpenDocument.
159. See David Armstrong & Jesse Drucker, Dutch Bank Funded U.S. Tax Shelters, WALL ST.
J., May 2, 2008 (discussing whistleblower claim for federal recoveries of taxes involving more than
100 tax shelters involving U.S. companies, which may have saved these companies at least $1.46
billion in taxes), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120968938981461421.html?mod=
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or obligations imposed by foreign law, which should not necessarily
bind our government in its enforcement efforts.
Further discussion and exploration of the ethical concerns presented
in this context is beyond the limited scope of this article. It is, however,
quite clear that important issues remain essentially unresolved in
Congress' attempt to design the whistleblower award scheme.
IRS administrative rules impose a number of other limitations on
eligibility for the informant discretionary award program, which are
rooted in prudential and ethical concerns. For example, employees of
the Treasury Department, whether or not they are also employees of the
IRS, are ineligible for informants' awards. 160 Other Federal employees
are also ineligible if they obtained the information as part of their official
duties.161 However, a Federal employee who obtained information apart
from his/her official duties is deemed eligible to the same extent as other
informants. 62  Police officers are also eligible for rewards, unless a
statute or ordinance specifically excludes them from accepting a
reward. 163 Moreover, an award payment that would be "contrary to State
or local law" may be denied. 64
In Notice 2008-4,165 the IRS issued interim guidance indicating that
it will follow some of these restrictions from the discretionary informant
award program in the whistleblower award program. The notice lists
several examples of claims that would not be processed, including those
submitted by Treasury Department employees or other government
employees acting within the scope of their duties. 166 Significantly, the
Notice also includes "claims submitted ...by an individual who is
precluded by Federal law or regulation from making the disclosure.'
167
Although this example indicates that IRS administrative practices may
googlenewswsj. At an award level of fifteen percent, this translates to more than $200 million,
excluding penalties and interest that may increase the award.
160. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.2.2.16(1)(a) (1999).
161. Seeid. § 25.2.2.17.
162. Id. § 25.2.2.16(l)(d). To illustrate, the Internal Revenue Manual states that a postal
worker who overheard a taxpayer boasting about his nonpayment of taxes to customers in his store
was allowed a reward. Id. Here, the IRM does not state whether the postal worker was on his
rounds delivering mail, and if so whether that would affect eligibility based on performance of
official duties.
163. See id. § 25.2.2.16(2).
164. See id. § 25.2.2.17(3)(g).
165. I.R.C. Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253 (Dec. 19 2007), available at 2007 WL 4427860.
166. Id. § 3.04 ex. 1.
167. Id. § 3.04 ex. 2. State laws are not taken into account in this example, although the
Internal Revenue Manual would consider a violation of state laws as a basis for denial. See
INTERNAL REvENuE MANUAL § 25.2.2.17(3)(g).
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respect U.S. legal obligations to maintain privacy, the statutory basis for
such a restriction is unclear, and this may be tested in litigation.'68
When the parameters for obtaining an award are set forth in the
whistleblower award statute, introducing additional restrictions or
constraints by administrative pronouncement or regulation is
problematic. As the politically accountable branch, Congress should
direct attention to the important value questions lurking here and further
restrict the categories of informants eligible for whistleblower awards.
These issues are too significant and value-laded to be left to the
discretion of the IRS, or to ad hoc development through the courts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The available data suggests that using informants can improve the
effectiveness of the examination function and reduce the tax gap in a
manner that increases the likelihood that noncompliant taxpayers are
selected for examination. Provisions in the Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006 have improved upon the prior system for informant awards
by enhancing incentives for informant participation. Claimants under
the discretionary informant program under I.R.C. § 7623(a) may now
obtain larger rewards based on collections that include interest, as well
as taxes and penalty collections. More significantly, the whistleblower
award program under I.R.C. § 7623(b) of the Code increases not only
the amount of awards, but also the certainty and predictability of
obtaining them without requiring an advance contract.
Despite a worthy effort, significant shortcomings persist in the
whistleblower award program. By empowering claimants to seek
judicial review of award determinations and removing the requirement
for an advance contract, the whistleblower award program bolsters
incentives for coming forward, but judicial review presents additional
practical and legal questions that deserve further attention. These
include the scope of review, the means of protecting taxpayer privacy
with regard to tax and financial information, and the means of protecting
the internal investigative processes of the IRS. Preserving the secrecy of
a whistleblower's identity can be achieved through implementing Tax
Court procedures for anonymity, but proceedings to examine
168. Moreover, not all legal obligations to maintain privacy may bear the same weight in
relation to competing values of improving tax compliance. For example, legislative protections
aimed at protecting an individual's personal information from disclosure to other firms or to the
public (including those who might steal his/her identity) may not provide a sufficient basis to
prevent disclosure to the IRS for the limited purpose of enhancing tax compliance, particularly
when sufficient safeguards exist to protect that information from further public disclosure.
2009]
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determinations of the whistleblower office will potentially involve other
confidential information, thereby setting up an inherent conflict between
the interests of the whistleblower in enforcing his/her award and the
privacy and/or confidentiality interests of the targeted taxpayer and the
government.
Perhaps the greatest concern about the whistleblower award system,
however, involves the ability to reward those who breach professional
relationships of trust or confidence. The only categorical constraint in
the Code affects those who planned or initiated transactions on behalf of
others, when those planner/initiators were also convicted of a crime.
The public expects ethical behavior from the government, just as it is
expected from taxpayers and their representatives. Enhancing tax
collections is important, but other values also deserve consideration in
framing an effective award system. "[T]he goal of IRS attorneys cannot
be to collect the most revenue for the Government or to win cases at all
costs. Rather, the goal is to ensure that the tax system is administered
fairly and impartially."
169
Whistleblowers can become important tools to efficiently and
effectively uncover noncompliance, thus increasing the perceived
fairness of the tax system. However, an award system that induces
professionals invited into a taxpayer's private sphere for other purposes
to breach confidential relationships arguably detracts from that basic
fairness. Congress needs to revisit the whistleblower program and
provide needed clarification on this important value question by
precluding awards to those who violate professional obligations of
confidentiality.
169. Hartman v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-124, at 66-68 (2008) (summarizing statements
of then-IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams in connection with IRS misconduct in litigation).
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